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Detecting Discrimination in Small Business Lending 
 
Abstract 
With limited financial sophistication, entrepreneurial consumers approach the financial 
marketplace more like retail financial consumers than business customers.  However, the 
assumption of both legislators and regulators is that business-borrowers are more financially 
savvy than consumer-borrowers, and thus do not require as broad-reaching protections. This gap 
between marketplace policy protections and the lived reality of the vast majority of small 
business entrepreneurs sets the stage for entrepreneurial consumers to fall through the regulatory 
cracks and sets the stage for possible exploitation and abuse. This situation is potentially 
exacerbated for minority entrepreneurs who belong to protected classes that are generally more 
vulnerable to exploitation in the marketplace including the small business lending marketplace. 
In this paper, we highlight the current state of this policy gap in the marketplace relative to 
minority entrepreneurial consumers and present a matched-paired mystery shopping study that 
demonstrates the critical need for reliable, primary data to inform regulatory agencies as they 
work to implement available protections to ensure equal access to credit within the small 
business lending marketplace.  
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Detecting Discrimination in Small Business Lending 
 
Introduction 
 Customers for entrepreneurial, small-business financial products most often lack 
sophisticated or even basic financial acumen (Bone, Christensen, and Williams, 2014).  Of the 
29.6 million small businesses in the United States1, 80% are sole proprietorships that have no 
employees at all (U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), 2017). With limited financial 
sophistication, these entrepreneurial consumers approach the financial marketplace more like 
retail financial consumers than business customers.  However, the assumption of both legislators 
and regulators is that business-borrowers are more financially savvy than consumer-borrowers, 
and thus do not require as broad-reaching protections (Wiersch and Weiss, 2015; Bone, 2006).  
This gap between marketplace policy protections and the lived reality of the vast majority of 
small business entrepreneurs sets the stage for entrepreneurial consumers to fall through the 
regulatory cracks which allows a greater possibility for exploitation and abuse.  This situation is 
potentially exacerbated for minority entrepreneurs who belong to protected classes that are 
generally more vulnerable to exploitation in the marketplace including the entrepreneurial 
financial products marketplace (Bone, Christensen, and Williams, 2014).   
 In this paper, we highlight the current state of this policy gap in the marketplace relative 
to minority entrepreneurial consumers and describe what has been called “a spaghetti soup” of 
oversite in the current regulatory environment (Mills and McCarthy, 2016). This demonstrates 
the critical need for reliable, primary data to inform regulatory agencies as they work to 
implement available protections to ensure equal access to credit within the small business 
                                                            
1 A small business is defined as an independent business with fewer than 500 employees (SBA, 2017) 
 4 
lending marketplace. To this end, we present a case study of a viable and relied upon 
methodology for gaining insight into small-business entrepreneurs and their experiences in the 
financial marketplace—matched-paired mystery shopper testing. 
Current State of the Regulatory Environment 
On May 10, 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released a white 
paper and Request for Information (RFI) due September 14, 2017, regarding the Small Business 
Lending Market (CFPB, May 10, 2017). The Bureau is using this RFI to gain a better 
understanding of the small business market and the opportunities available to minority and 
women-owned small businesses. The Bureau is searching for greater data regarding the products 
offered to these businesses as well as information depicting the true costs of collecting and 
reporting such data (CFPB, 2017).   
 This is the first concrete step the CFPB has undertaken to exert its authority regarding the 
implementation of Section 1071. Section 1071 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) (Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173) requires financial 
intuitions that engage in small business lending to report their lending activities with the same 
transparency already required of home mortgage lending sector. The CFPB has been tasked with 
both rule making authority and the authority to collect this data. 
 Since 1975, the federal government has been collecting data from financial institutions 
that issue home mortgages made in the United States under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) (80 Fed. Reg. 66127). Under HMDA, many financial institutions are required to report 
their mortgage data to the public. Their reporting must include, among other data points, the 
race, gender, marital status, national origin, and credit score of applicants and borrowers (80 Fed. 
Reg. 66127).  The federal government analyzes this data to “determin[e] whether financial 
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institutions are serving the housing needs of their communities; and in identifying possible 
discriminatory lending patterns” (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2016). 
 However, the home mortgage reporting requirements do not extend to small business 
loans. Currently, the publicly available data for small business lending has been mostly limited to 
the information about loans backed by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), with its 
annual report, Small Business Lending in the United States, giving only a small peek into general 
small business lending practices. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data also offers some 
insight, but only shows the aggregate dollar volume of loans originated to businesses with 
revenues less than $1 million and is only required from institutions with assets over $1.2 billion. 
Also, there is very limited data on the experience potential applicants have during the pre-
application phase and the role that discrimination could play in determining entrepreneurs’ 
decision to apply for credit (Bone, Christensen, and Williams, 2014).  
 
Small Business Economy 
Small businesses are an integral component of America’s economy. In fact, in 2013 
99.9% of all U.S. firms were small businesses (U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), 
2016), and they have provided 55% of all jobs in the United States since the 1970s (SBA, 2017). 
Between 1993 and 2011, small businesses provided 63% of net new jobs (SBA, 2016). In 
addition, they generated 46% of private nonfarm GDP in 2008 (Kobe, 2012). In 2012, 29.3% of 
small businesses were minority-owned (SBA, 2016). Not only do these minority-owned 
businesses provide jobs, but they also strengthen and support communities. In the early 2000’s, 
minority-owned businesses employed more than 4.7 million people (Silver, 2014). During the 
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last two decades, minority-owned businesses have outpaced their counterparts in growth and 
gross receipts (Silver, 2014; Minority Business Development Agency, 2010). 
 Access to credit is necessary for any business to succeed. For small businesses, the 
inability to access credit can be particularly detrimental because it restricts these businesses from 
expanding. The Federal Reserve Bank’s 2016 Small Business Credit Survey highlights that 64% 
of small businesses who apply for credit do so to expand business opportunities and that 55% of 
these applicants are looking for financing of $100,000 or less (Federal Reserve Banks, 2017).  
 Both academic and private sector research reveals that minority small business owners 
are denied credit from traditional banking services at higher rates than white small business 
owners (Bates and Robb, 2015; Asiedu, Freeman, and Nti-Addae, 2012).  This denial produces 
far greater negative results above and beyond the lack of credit availability itself for specific 
businesses.  
  The Federal Reserve Bank survey also found that 55% of small business owners surveyed 
did not even apply for credit (Federal Reserve Banks, 2017).  The third leading reason for not 
applying given by the participants was discouragement, which in this study is defined as “those 
[firms] that did not apply for financing because they believed they would be turned down” 
(Federal Reserve Banks, 2017). Another Federal Reserve Bank study found that 22.2% of 
minority neighborhood businesses were discouraged borrowers, compared to 14.8% of 
businesses from other urban localities (Wiersch, Lipman, and Barkley, 2016). The probability of 
minority businesses owners receiving higher rates of credit denials combined with a higher 
likelihood of becoming discouraged borrowers yields negative repercussions for minority 
communities.  
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 This disproportionate credit denial creates a perception among minority small business 
owners that there is no credit available to them from traditional sources; as these business owners 
still need loans, they turn to alternative sources of financing (Wiersch, Lipman, and Barkley, 
2016).  Alternative sources of credit on their face may sound like viable solutions but some 
borrowers may inadvertently succumb to predatory lenders (Weinberger, 2017; CFPB, 2016).  
 In essence, the actual denial of a business owner’s application for credit is not the only 
stage of the process when credit is denied. Denial of credit also occurs when the applicant 
consciously chooses not to submit an application at all, whether due to prior negative 
experiences and interactions with banks or due to the applicant’s general impression that the 
application will be denied (Federal Reserve Banks, 2017; Bates and Robb, 2015; Bone, 
Christensen and Williams, 2014). The Kauffman Foundation highlighted this negative 
disproportionate reality reporting that “58.5% of [African American] entrepreneurs who did not 
seek additional financing despite needing it [did so] because they thought the business would not 
be approved by a lender…[and] are almost three times more likely than whites to have profits 
negatively impacted by lack of access to capital” (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2016). 
   
State of the Law and Regulation of Small Business 
 Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in 1974. In 2010, under 
Dodd-Frank, jurisdiction for ECOA was largely transferred from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (the Federal Reserve Board) to the newly created CFPB.  As a result, 
Dodd-Frank effectively gave the CFPB rule making, supervisory, and enforcement powers 
regarding ECOA for most financial institutions.2 
                                                            
2	  The CFPB regulates ECOA compliance for banks, savings associations, and credit unions with assets over $10 
billion. It shares enforcement authority with the Federal Trade Commission over mortgage brokers, mortgage 
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 ECOA is one of a few laws that provide fair lending protections for consumers. The Fair 
Housing Act also extends fair lending protections to consumers (42 U.S.C. § 3605). However, 
the Fair Housing Act’s jurisdiction is limited to financial creditors who engage in residential real 
estate related transactions, commonly referred to as mortgage products. ECOA expands fair 
lending laws to all creditors; “it is not limited to consumer loans. [ECOA is] applied to any 
extension of credit, including extensions of credit to small business.” (The Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) et al., 1994).  
 There are eight protected classes under ECOA: race or color, religion, national origin, 
sex, marital status, age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract), the applicant's 
receipt of income derived from any public assistance program, and the applicant's exercise, in 
good faith, of any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act (59 Fed. Reg. 73, 1994). 
 Under ECOA a creditor is prohibited from discriminating against a member of a 
protected class at any time during the credit transaction, including activities occurring in the pre-
application phase (59 Fed. Reg. 73, 1994). Discriminatory actions include but are not limited to:  
•   Failing to provide information or services or provide different information or services 
regarding any aspect of the lending process, including credit availability, application 
procedures, or lending standards; 
•   Discouraging or selectively encouraging applicants with respect to inquiries about or 
applications for credit; 
                                                            
originators, mortgage servicers, lenders offering private education loans, and payday lenders, regardless of size. The 
Comptroller of Currency has compliance authority for national banks, federal savings associations, and federal 
branches of foreign banks with total assets under $10 billion. The Federal Reserve Board retains compliance 
authority for financial institutions with total assets under $10 billion that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has compliance authority over state banks with total assets 
under $10 billion. The National Credit Union Association has compliance authority over federal credit unions 
(United States Department of Justice (2016).  
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•   Refusing to extend credit or use different standards in determining whether to extend 
credit; 
•   Varying the terms of credit offered, including the amount, interest rate, duration, or type 
of loan; 
•   Using different standards to evaluate collateral (59 Fed. Reg. 73, 1994). 
 
It is the role of federal agencies to enact and enforce the laws that Congress passes. 
Within a single law, oversight and enforcement responsibilities may fall on a single agency or be 
shared among many different agencies. There are at least six different agencies that have 
regulatory authority over financial institutions that issue small business loans, in addition to 
individual state regulations and oversight (Mills and McCarthy, 2017). This fragmented and 
sometimes overlapping approach can make effective oversight challenging and risks leaving 
gaps in important protections for small-business entrepreneurs. Until the implementation of 
Section 1071 of the Dodd Frank Act, most of the regulations in place to protect borrowers 
specifically related to consumer loans, not small business loans (Mills and McCarthy, 2017). As 
previously noted, it is the apparent assumption of both legislators and regulators is that business-
borrowers are more financially savvy than consumer borrowers, and thus do not require as 
broad-reaching protections (Wiersch and Weiss, 2015; Bone, 2006). However, unlike 
commercial borrowers who often have staff with financial expertise and long-term banking 
relationships, many small business owners have limited exposure to traditional credit and 
banking procedures. The current gaps in regulation and oversight, particularly in the online 
lending space, has left the small business-lending environment open for potential abuse. The 
implementation of Section 1071 is the first step to better understanding the small business-
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lending marketplace and offering transparency into the types of products and terms small 
business borrowers are entering into.  
 
Small Business Lending Data 
The SBA produces an annual report entitled Small Business Lending in the United States 
(U.S. Small Business Administration, 2013). The report examines “depository lending 
institutions and their lending patterns to small businesses” (U.S. Small Business Administration, 
2013, 1). However, the report is limited to data obtained from the only two publically available 
sources of information on small business lending: Call Reports (data collected by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation) and CRA data (collected by Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council). These two data sources only reflect the supply of loans, meaning loans 
that were actually provided by banks and savings and loans associations. They do not reflect 
demand, meaning those loans applied for but never obtained, nor do they reflect other sources of 
marketplace credit such as suppliers, credit cards, families and friends, or finance companies 
(U.S. Small Business Administration, 2013).  
Beyond the SBA’s annual report, other sources of small business data are extremely 
limited. Lenders are required to report small business lending data regarding the administration 
of SBA 7(a) Program loans (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 2014).  However, 
in FY2015, only 2,163 lenders participated in the SBA 7(a) lending program, which was the 
lowest number of participants in 8 years, and most lenders originate fewer than 10 7(a) loans per 
year (OCC, 2014).  Like the Call Reports and CRA data referenced above, this data only reflects 
loans that are approved by the bank, not applications that are denied. Upon request to the SBA, 
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the public can obtain race and gender data on the SBA programs’ small business borrowers, but 
it is not regularly published (Silver, 2014).  
The Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund will also provide loan 
data by request, but this data only shows the county where funds are distributed and the purpose 
and use of the funds (Silver, 2014). Several private and nonprofit entities, like the Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation, Graziadio School of Business and Management,and the FIELD Program 
at the Aspen Institute have attempted various forms of surveys across a multitude of small 
business owner populations, but each of these surveys only provide fragmented subsets of 
information and lack common variables which would enable comprehensive comparisons and 
conclusions (Silver 2014).  
The CFPB, using the limited data available, estimates that the small business financing 
market is approximately $1.4 trillion, with only 7% of those loans being SBA Program loans 
(CFPB, 2017). This means, due to the lack of required reporting, there is over $1.3 trillion in 
financing issued by banks, non-banks, online lenders, and other marketplace financers for which 
is there no publically data on terms, conditions, or demographics of the products and consumers, 
and no data-driven understanding of the marketplace in which these loans were issued.  
Data is a required component in combatting institutional and systematic discrimination, 
but it is not effective in a vacuum. Matched-pair mystery shopper testing is a valuable 
investigative tool (Freiberg, 2009) for uncovering the systematic and institutional barriers that 
raw data and surveys alone cannot detect. The U.S. Department of Justice, the CFPB, and HUD 
have all used mystery shopping testers to uncover institutional discrimination that exists in 
consumer lending. However, to date, none of these agencies have attempted to use mystery 
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shopping testing to uncover potential discrimination possibly faced by minority small business 
entrepreneurial consumers.  
The implementation of HMDA led to a rise in the targeting and efficiency of mystery 
shopping testing and, in turn, an increase in enforcement of the fair lending laws in retail 
consumer credit (Ahuja, 2017). We propose that the proper implementation of Section 1071 may 
have a similar effect and could spur financial institutions to working harder on comprehensive, 
nondiscriminatory approaches to all types of lending including lending to entrepreneurial small 
business consumers.  
 We will now present a case study to demonstrate how a matched-pair mystery shopping 
methodology can be used to investigate potential differences in lending treatment to minority 
small business consumers. This case study illustrates the nuanced ways that minorities may be 
disproportionally denied credit or become discouraged borrowers and highlights the need for the 
implementation of regulations like Section 1071 to shine more light on these disparities. 
 
Small Business Lending Mystery Shopping Case Study 
Method  
We conducted fair lending tests using a matched-paired mystery shopping methodology 
to test for racial discrimination in small business lending. The purpose of this mystery shopping 
research, commonly known as “testing”, was to determine the baseline customer experience level 
that minority and non-minority mystery shoppers received when seeking information about small 
business loans. We investigated the potential for disparate treatment of small business customers 
during the preapplication (or loan inquiry) stage of the loan application process at a bank. 
Mystery shopping audit studies have been conducted in a variety of service sectors (Finn 2007) 
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to detect discrimination, such as in the case of car shopping (Ayres and Siegelman 1995) and 
renting an apartment or purchasing a home (Galster 1991; Yinger 1998). Mystery shopping 
methods are ideal to capture factual evidence beyond potentially subjective perceptions of the 
experience (Ainscough and Motley 2000; Finn 2001). Precedent exists for using mystery 
shopping in discrimination litigation in the United States that assess employee and firm 
performance to determine whether consumers receive differential treatment in the “process” of 
requesting products/services (Lubin 2011). Financial institutions regularly conduct “testing” 
mystery shopping studies in response to and in prevention of fair-lending violations (Lubin 
2011). For example, banking institutions regularly conduct mystery shopping tests to mitigate 
and eliminate the risks and penalties resulting from routine regulatory and compliance fair 
lending audits.  
 
Bank Sampling 
We tested 16 bank locations in two large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the 
eastern United States. These markets were selected by first analyzing the regional demographic 
composition of each bank’s location according to the United States’ 2010 Census Data tracts 
categorized as low, moderate, middle, and upper income as classified under Consumer 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) guidelines using median family income. We then used CRA data 
collected by the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC) to determine the 
lending patterns of these banks. This data revealed the number and dollar amount of loans 
originated to each census tract. This study analyzes interactions amongst branches that have 
high, moderate, and low levels of spending to those of low-moderate income tracts. We 
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conducted a total of 52 tests (or 26 matched-pairs with one African-American tester and one 
Caucasian tester).  
 
Study Design and Procedures 
We recruited six African American and five Caucasian male testers to test for the 
protected group of race under ECOA. African American testers were the protected group and the 
Caucasian testers served as the control group. Testers were trained extensively about business 
and banking terminology and loan products. The testers were matched and pretested on critical 
personal characteristics (e.g., age, height, body build, attractiveness, education) (Ainscough and 
Motley 2000; Lubin 2011). All testers wore a blue collared shirt and khaki trousers. Matching 
testers on these personal characteristics enabled us to compare the outcomes of the tests by race.  
Testers came to the banks with nearly identical business profiles and strong credit 
histories to inquire about a small business loan product ($60,000 – $70,000 loan to expand their 
business and to possibly hire a part-time employee). The profiles of the test and control groups 
were sufficiently strong that on paper, either profile would be very likely to be approved for a 
loan. We slightly modified the distinguishing characteristics of borrower characteristics, 
including the consumer’s name, the company name, and reason for visiting this bank. We did 
this to reduce the chance that testers would be detected as mystery shoppers. We designed the 
profiles for both the protected and control testers to be well above the threshold of what is 
acceptable loan requests, however, we designed the qualifications of African American testers to 
be superior to the qualifications of the Caucasian testers. In other words, on paper the protected, 
African American, tester was financially better off than the control, Caucasian, tester. Thus, one 
would hope for the experience of African Americans to be more positive, or at the very least, 
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equal to the experience of the Caucasians.  This makes this study a conservative test for the 
presence, if any, of disparate and discriminatory treatment in the test condition. 
Each pair of testers was assigned to visit the same retail location of the bank; one visited 
in the morning and the other in the afternoon. We alternated the times of the assignments within 
the race/test variable. Testers were trained to conduct each test and shown how to capture and 
record the pertinent information needed to complete an online questionnaire immediately after 
each visit using iPads and an online survey instrument. Once the test was completed, the test 
coordinator followed up with each tester to review their testing experience. 
 On entering the bank, the tester stated that he was interested in meeting with someone 
about a loan for his small business. In most cases, the testers were directed to a bank loan officer 
from whom they gathered information on available loan and financial products. Consistent with 
the preapplication tests used by regulatory agencies and the courts (Lubin 2011), testers listened 
and gathered the information provided about the options, availability, and terms of the financial 
products discussed.  
The questionnaire measured three classes of the consumers’ experience with bank 
officers, including the information provided, the information required for loan application, and 
the encouragement and assistance demonstrated to the consumer (Bone, Christensen, and 
Williams 2014). We selected the measures on the basis of their accepted and relied upon status in 
legal precedent and regulatory usage (Lubin 2011).   
 
Results 
 We analyzed the data using the chi-square difference test on the proportions of reported 
values for African American and Caucasian testers. We compared differences in the information 
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requested by the bank officer. The results show that African-American testers were asked to 
provide more information about their businesses and personal financials than Caucasian testers. 
Specifically, compared with the Caucasian testers, African American testers were more 
frequently requested to provide the information of their business financial statements (73.1% vs. 
50.0; c2 = 2.93; p = .09), the amount of their accounts receivable (11.5% vs. 0.0%; c2 = 3.18; p = 
.07), and their personal W-2 forms (30.8% vs. 0.0%; c2 = 9.46; p = .01).  In addition, we 
identified a troublesome pattern of loan officers inquiring about marital status. Asking about 
marital status as a determination of credit worthiness is a direct violation of fair lending law (15 
USCS § 1691). We found that African American testers were asked if they were married (marital 
status) (M = 23.1%) significantly more frequently than compared to Caucasian testers (M = 
3.8%; c2 = 4.13; p = .04).  In addition, African American testers were asked about spousal 
employment status (M = 11.5%) significantly more frequently than compared to Caucasian 
testers (M = 0.0%; c2 = 3.18; p = .07). The similar test and control profiles are created in a 
manner that should result in a loan approval based solely on the income of the tester alone.  
There would be no reason or need to incorporate a spouse’s income into the credit worthiness 
decision-making process.  Furthermore, only the Africa-American testers where asked if their 
spouse is employed.  
The results also reveal differences in the level of assistance and encouragement offered to 
the African American testers. Compared with their Caucasian counterparts, African American 
testers were less frequently thanked for coming in (80.8% vs. 96.2%; c2 = 3.01; p = .08). 
Micro-aggressions.  In addition to analyzing the data using empirical quantitative 
methods, we collected detailed narratives from each test.  In these narratives the tester was asked 
to explain each of the actors (e.g. bank employees) involved, the detailed events of their 
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interaction and the conversation and discourse they experienced during their time in the bank.  
Comparing the narratives of the African-American testers to the Caucasian narratives revealed 
that African-American testers experienced micro-aggressions along with the disparate treatment 
they received. Victims of consumer discrimination bear a psychological burden as a result of 
overt and subconscious discrimination. Because consumer discrimination occurs in everyday 
situations, it constitutes the kind of micro-aggressions that can have cumulative debilitating 
effects over the course of a person’s lifetime (Sue et al. 2007). For example, we found that on 
multiple occasions the loan officer during their visit with African American testers went to a 
government website listing all registered businesses to verify if the minority tester’s business 
was registered and in good standing.  This did not occur for any Caucasian tester. 
Analyzing the narratives of matched-paired tests to the same bank location revealed other 
types of micro-aggressions experienced and reported by African-American testers. For example, 
while both testers lived about an hour from the bank branch, it was suggested to the African-
American tester to visit a bank branch closer to his home, while the Caucasian tester was told 
that the business specialist is not in and offered to set up a meeting for the next time the business 
specialist is available. Another example that occurred is of a matched-pair where the tester met 
with the same loan officer on the same day.  Both testers were asked about the location of their 
business which was according to the scenario they were trained on, about an hour away from the 
bank.  In this incident, the African-American tester was then asked why he was in area and he 
responded as directed by saying that he was in the area to meet with a potential client.  On the 
other hand, the Caucasian tester was not asked this question. 
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The analysis of narratives also revealed product steering by the bank officers who 
mentioned and explained home equity loans of credit (HELOC) to African American testers, but 
did not do so with the Caucasian testers they met with on the same day.   
 
Conclusion 
 A careful review of the current state of public policy, regulation, small business economy 
and the limited availability of data on small business lending reveal a research and societal 
imperative to implement systematic data collection around small business lending practices. At 
this juncture where new policy is being created around the implementation of Section 1071, 
reliable and accepted methods to supply useful data to policymakers is both timely and 
important.  One approach of how this might be done is illustrated in the matched-paired mystery 
shopping case study, where the purpose was to determine the presence, if any, of disparate and 
discriminatory treatment in the test condition. Our findings suggest that public policy makers, 
including the CFPB need to engage in a dialogue with the financial industry, regulators and 
public at-large to discuss the social and economic imperatives of protecting small business 
entrepreneurial consumers. This will be accomplished as the CFPB works with financial industry 
leaders to develop “best practices” and other compliance  measures to ensure that all potential 
applicants receive information in in the same manner on a level playing field.  Data collection 
efforts should concentrate on gathering data to ensure that:  
1.   Loan information provided by loan officers does not vary, regardless of the consumer’s 
race/ethnicity;.  
2.   Bank officers impose a similar standard of scrutiny to all borrowers applying for a loan; 
and 
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3.   Bank officers provide appropriate encouragement and assistance to all potential loan 
applicants regardless of race/color.  
In the presented case study, the tests were designed to present the African American tester 
as the most creditworthy.  Despite this fact, on several measures the matched-paired mystery 
shopping study revealed that the African American testers underwent a higher level of scrutiny 
and received a lower level of assistance than their less-creditworthy Caucasian counterparts. 
Also, African American testers were asked significantly more often about their marital status and 
their spouse’s employment, which marks another and even illegal differential experience for 
these minority entrepreneurial consumers compared with the Caucasian shoppers.   
Preapplication testing should be utilized to enforce existing fair lending laws. Under ECOA 
a creditor is prohibited from discriminating against a member of a protected class at any time 
during the credit transaction including activities occurring in the pre-application phase (59 Fed. 
Reg. 73, 1994). Results from our study indicate that matched-paired mystery shopping testing for 
enforcement purposes would reveal evidence that bank officers may sometimes provide different 
information or services regarding credit availability, application procedures, and lending 
standards; discouraging minority applicants with respect to inquiries about or applications for 
small business credit; and use different (even potentially illegal) standards in determining 
whether to extend credit (59 Fed. Reg. 73, 1994). 
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